A reunification of Ireland had been within the bounds of possibilities ever since the Ireland Act of 1920. In the course of the years the sense of a united Ireland had changed from Ireland as constituent country, or home nation, from the United Kingdom to one undivided Republic of Ireland comprising 32 counties. Whatever the detonation, for decades the Unionists in Northern Ireland couldn't care less about the Republican fantasy of a united Ireland, especially because the United Kingdom never called a referendum on the matter. The presentation of William Whitelaw's The Future of Northern Ireland in September 1972 was a rude awakening for Unionists and Loyalists. The introduction of Power Sharing, but particularly the Irish Dimension and the influence in Northern Ireland invested in the Council of Ireland, turned the Republican dream into a Unionist nightmare.
Apart of feeling abandoned by the United Kingdom the Loyalists in Northern Ireland faced a new threat. Even though the influence of the Council of Ireland, as set out in the Sunningdale Agreement was marginal, they considered the Republic of Ireland a menace to their position, and therewith a legitimate battlefield.
Also before 1972 the Republic of Ireland wasn't free from violence. Especially Donegal and other border counties were on and off startled by shoot-outs, but fierce and indiscriminate violence was scarce until Dublin was startled by two explosions on 1 December 1972.
After a lengthy debate the Dáil Éireann, the parliament of the Republic of Ireland, prepared itself to vote on a bill that would provide the government greater powers in dealing with paramilitary, in particular members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and its branches, at the expense of civil liberties. The bill lacked support of Fine Gael and there was a good chance that the bill was voted down.
At about the same time the Belfast Newsletter received a phone call from a caller with a distinctly English accent who warned that bombs were planted near Liberty Hall and Clery's, a department store on O'Connell Street, in Dublin. The warning was merely symbolic as only three minutes later, at 7.58pm, a car bomb exploded near Liberty Hall. A second bomb detonated on Sackville Place just off O'Connell Street 17 minutes after and two employees of Córas Iompair Éireann (CIÉ), or Irish National Public Transport Organisation, were killed in the blast.
The session in the Dáil was adjourned for one hour. During this recess sentiments turned around and, because the biggest opponent Fine Gael abstained from voting, the bill passed.
No organisation has ever claimed responsibility and obviously the Provisional Irish Republican Army (pIRA) was initially the prime suspect, but then again why would they take the risk while the outcome of the voting seemed favourable?
Affecting the votes would prove very helpful to the opponents of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (pIRA) and consequently the investigation was focussed on the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF).
In the course of the primary investigation English accents, English drivers licenses and stolen cars registered to British owners surfaced everywhere. Appeals made by An Garda Síochána, the police force of the Republic of Ireland, to British authorities for information were of little avail. The unwilling, or at least guarded, attitude of the United Kingdom provides a breeding ground for the idea of British involvement in the bombings and tampering with parliamentary proceedings. Involvement of the Secret Air Service (SAS), the elite corps of the British army, is assumed by some, but there's no agreement regarding the degree of involvement. However, we emphasise that there is no evidence linking any organisation or individuals to the explosions Dublin bombings of 1 December 1972.
Within seven weeks after the explosions of 1 December 1972 Gardaí received an other warning call. The caller, a man with a native English tongue, stated that a bomb would explode on O'Connell Bridge. Ten minutes later, on 20 January 1973 at 3.20pm, 21 year old Tommy Douglas got killed by an exploding red Vauxhall Victor parked on Sackville Place.
The car was hijacked just off Shankill Road, the centre of a Loyalist district in Belfast, earlier that day and was spotted in Drogheda around noon. Apparently the driver was unfamiliar with Dublin's street as he drove against the direction of the traffic on Sackville Place, by doing so he blocked the road for oncoming traffic. A driver and a pedestrian called to account to which the Vauxhall went into reverse and cleared the way.
Apart from circumstantial clues the investigators had the disposal of two witnesses who had seen the driver of the red Vauxhall and his female passenger. There might have been someone else in the car, but the statements differ as regard to this aspect. Gardaí stated that the witnesses were interviewed and that a composition photo, a so-called photofit or identikit picture, was to be published shortly.
Remarkably the photo was never issued. Some authors argue the Republic of Ireland tried to smother something for the sake of peace and quiet, which in turn strengthen the conviction of British involvement. Whatever the case might be, as yet no organisation has claimed responsibility for the Dublin Bombing of 20 January 1973 and no one was indicted for the murder of Tommy Douglas.
The resistance against the Sunningdale Agreement had reached its peak in May 1974. In an attempt to avert the Council of Ireland, a body consisting of members of the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Dáil Éireann, the Ulster Workers' Council (UWC) called out on strike. Key facilities like power stations and petrol industry were brought to a standstill on 15 May and after a few days Northern Ireland was paralysed.
Around 5.30pm on Friday 17 May 1974, the third day of the Ulster Workers' Council Strike, the people of Dublin got prepared for the weekend. It was was the busiest time of the busiest day of the week and without prior warning three car bombs exploded within a time span of merely four minutes in Parnell Street, Talbot Street and South Leinster Street. In all 27 people, including the baby Martha O'Neill who was stillborn in August 1974 and admitted to the official list of causalities, lost their life by the explosions and hundreds were injured.
Ninety minutes later, at approximately 7.00pm, a further seven people got killed by a car bomb on North Street in Monaghan town.
With 34 deaths the Dublin and Monaghan Bombings of 17 May 1974 have the dubious honour of being the most bloodstained massacre of The Troubles.
The bombings were condemned by the Provisional Irish Republican Army (pIRA) in no uncertain terms. Because the cars containing the explosives, like the car used in the bombing of January 1973, were all stolen or hijacked in or near Loyalist areas in Belfast and Portadown the investigators turned their mind to Loyalist paramilitary. Although the attack remained unclaimed for Sammy Smyth, the spokesman of the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and the Ulster Workers' Council (UWC), said I am very happy about the bombings in Dublin. There is a war with the Free State and now we are laughing at them..
One day after the bombings Chief Superintendent John Joy announced a photofit of the South Leinster Street suspect to be published. Similar to the promised identikit picture of the suspect of the January bombing this picture too was never issued.
Seemingly the investigations of the Gardaí, as well as the investigations carried out by the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), led nowhere and were were officially wound down less then two months after the bombings on 9 July 1974.
Any further investigations and inquiries were put on ice despite an ongoing undercurrent of rumours and conspiracy theories. Surviving relatives and the injured had serious doubts about the actions taken by the Irish state in pursuing those responsible, the integrity of the police investigations, the complicity of state forces in Northern Ireland and finally they feared that known suspects would escape persecution. For over nineteen years their demands for explanation remained unanswered. Politicians and police preserved silence and the atrocity was almost forgotten indeed until the Yorkshire Television broadcast a documentary entitled Hidden Hand - The Forgotten Massacre on 6 July 1993.
After a profound investigation the producers of Hidden Hand - The Forgotten Massacre had dig up a list containing the names of 20 possible suspects of the Dublin and Monaghan Bombings. Each and every name on that list, which was composed by Gardaí and Constabulary within days after the explosions, belonged to a person affiliated with the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). Moreover witnesses were able to identify at least two drivers. Strange yet true, with the possible perpetrators within reach no one was arrested or even questioned by neither Constabulary nor Gardaí.
In addition the producers observed that the operation was technically far too complex for the organisation to accomplish without outside assistance.
The question as to where such assistance might have come from remained unanswered, but the producers stumbled upon a covert base of the Special Air Service (SAS) in Castledillon, County Armagh. It is suspected that this base, officially occupied by the Royal Engineers, accommodated a Special Air Service (SAS) unit known as Northern Ireland Training and Tactics Team (NITAT) from 1973 until 1975.
This period more or less coincides with a period of profound segmentation between the British domestic and foreign security services MI5 and MI6. The Secret Intelligence Service or MI6 aimed at a political solution to end the violence in Northern Ireland and supported the Sunningdale Agreement, whereas MI5, the Secret Service entrusted with domestic intelligence, was determined to prosecute the war against the Republican paramilitaries. In order to achieve their goals MI5 made advances to the outlawed Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and it is assumed that the Special Air Service (SAS) unit in Castledillon infiltrated the Portadown division of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). Probably the Special Air Service (SAS) also provided training facilities and even firearms and explosives. There are also witness reports stating that bombs were manufactured with explosives obtained from the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) in buildings controlled by officers of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC).
The documentary didn't yield definite answers and closure, but it did provide sturdy foundations for the rumours of colluding British intelligence and a cover-up operation. Apparently the producers had washed someone's your dirty linen because the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) suddenly issued a statement on 15 July claiming [...] without reservation that the entire operation was from its conception to its successful conclusion, planned and carried out by our volunteers aided by no outside bodies.. Rather remarkable to claim responsibility four decades after causing such havoc. More surprising or even suspicious is the rigorous denial of outside assistance. In fact this denial is the main theme of the brief statement. It might be an indication of overcompensation, in the psychological meaning, or a real strong attempt to shield off whoever or whatever they felt needed their protection.
Armed with the findings of the producers relatives and casualties of the bombings joined in pressure groups such as Justice for the Forgotten and the call for a full public inquiry got louder. Finally, on 19 December 1999 Justice Liam Hamilton was appointed to undertake a thorough examination, involving fact finding and assessment of all aspects of the bombings in 1974. Justice Henry Barron, who succeeded Justice Hamilton in 2000 due to illness, published the report of the commission of inquiry on 10 December 2003. Instead of the long-awaited clarification, this report was a bitter disappointment and provided barely new information.
After the first report, which covered only the Dublin and Monaghan Bombings of May 1974 and the Dundalk Bombing of 19 December 1975, Justice Baron published his second report, concerning the Dublin Bombings of 1972 and 1973 and the bombing in Belturbet in December 1972, in February 2005. Just as in his first report Justice Barron concluded that there was no firm evidence of British collusion. The report however is highly critical of the surprising and disappointing lack of co-operation of the British authorities.
Occasionally new incriminating leads surface. Most of them give support to the idea that British secret services were to some extend involved in several bombings committed by the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) in the Republic of Ireland between 1972 and 1974. Relatives and survivors somehow has to deal with the knowledge that composition photos, eye witness reports and even names leading to the possible perpetrators are stored somewhere deep down in a locked file cabinet.