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Direct Rule
In the aftermath of Bloody Sunday the British Prime Minister, Edward Heath, announced the dissolution of the Stormont government on 24 March 1972 and from 30 March onwards Northern Ireland was governed from Westminster again. Immediately after the suspension of the Stormont Parliament William Whitelaw, then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, made clear that Direct Rule was only a provisional condition until Northern Ireland was able to govern itself. Being an optimist Whitelaw assumed that the job would be done in two or three yeas and, credit where credit is due, he really pushed ahead.
As soon as September 1972 Whitelaw unveiled his vision of Northern Irish politics on a conference in Darlington and in the discussion paper The Future of Northern Ireland. Broadly speaking Whitelaw's concept was based on two columns: Power Sharing and the Irish Dimension.
Power Sharing was to be realised by a parliament elected by general elections, the Northern Ireland Assembly, and a body much the same as a cabinet, the Power Sharing Executive, which was to be formatted by the Assembly.
The Irish Dimension, the concept based on an economic dependency of Northern Ireland on the United Kingdom on one hand and a cultural, historical, geographical and ethnical communality of the island Ireland on the other, had to be worked out by the Council of Ireland, a body made up from members of the parliament of the Republic of Ireland, the Dáil Éireann, and the Northern Ireland Assembly. The scope of action of the Council of Ireland wasn't well-defined yet.
Border Poll
Before going into elections a referendum on the future status of Northern Ireland was held. The question presented at the electorate was whether Northern Ireland was to remain part of the United Kingdom or to join the Republic of Ireland. This so-called Border Poll was the first opportunity given to the people of Northern Ireland to opt out of the Union since the establishment of Saorstát Éireann, or the Irish Free State, in 1922. The United Kingdom held high hopes and dreamed out loud about calling such a referendum every ten years or so. After all, a favourable outcome and a reasonable turnout would justify the present status of Northern Ireland by democratic means. From a demographical viewpoint the wind was fair for the Union by then, but the turnout gummed up the works.
Nationalist and Republican parties called out on boycotting because the Border Poll was not conducted on an all-Ireland basis, whereas the campaigns of the Unionist and Loyalist parties excelled. Both messages were well received and acted on by the people of Northern Ireland. Just over the 58% of the electorate turned up and from the valid votes almost 99% voted in favour of the Union.
Due to the meagre turnout the results were barely justifiable and, although the option of joining the Republic of Ireland by referendum is still left open by later agreements as far as and included the Good Friday Agreement, the Border Poll of 8 March 1973 was the first and, until now, the latest of its kind.
On the same day that the Border Poll was held bombs exploded near the Old Bailey and a government building in London. The Provisional Irish Republican Army (pIRA) immediately claimed responsibility, but stated that there was no relation whatsoever between the assault and the ongoing referendum. Until this day, and in spite of the arrest of a group of volunteers, among which the Price Sisters, swiftly after the explosions, Scotland Yard is doubtful about both statements.
Considerable portions of Whitelaw's discussion paper were developed and eventually made it, with the unsatisfying results of the Border Poll in mind, to a White Paper entitled Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals.
Power Sharing – Assembly and Executive
Power Sharing implied that general elections were to be held and that the Northern Ireland Assembly, the future parliament of Northern Ireland, consisted of a proportional representation of Protestants and Catholics.
Although a hurdle on its own Power Sharing wasn't the only issue in the forthcoming elections. The parties also had to take up a stand concerning the constitutional proposals as set forth in the White Paper.
By tradition Sinn Féin, by then still attached to its aversion for collaborating with Brits, stood aloof from every political mean to archive an independent and unified Ireland and consequently boycotted the elections. The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), led by Ian Paisley, rejected the idea of Power Sharing completely. From a political point of view Ian Paisley was an unguided and highly unpredictable projectile in those days since he gradually evolved from a loyal supporter of the Union into one of the few Unionists who believed in and aimed at an independent Northern Ireland. Nonetheless this extremist party took part in the elections.
The Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), led by the former Northern Ireland Prime Minister Brian Faulkner, was deeply divided due to the merger of Power Sharing and the White Paper, by which the Republic of Ireland would gain influence in Northern Irish affairs through the Council of Ireland. Sympathisers of the largest Unionist party who opposed the White Paper was given the opportunity to vote for the anti-White Paper wing. Those who opposed Power Sharing, among which the former Stormont Minister William Craig who's famous for his flaming speeches, weren't heard by the party leadership and established the Vanguard Unionist Progressive Party.
The Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI), a Union-minded non-sectarian party emanating from the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), took up the centre field of the election arena, which was completed with parties of little significance.
In all 19 political parties took part in the elections of 28 June 1973 to divide the 78 seats of the Northern Ireland Assembly.
With 31 seats the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) emerged victor by a large margin. Seven seats however were won by the anti-White Paper wing, so actually the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) occupied just 24 seats in the Assembly.
After the elections Faulkner, being the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), faced the task of forming the Power Sharing Executive. The ideological most obvious coalition partners, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the Vanguard Unionist Progressive Party with eight and seven seats respectively, rejected Power Sharing and consequently dropped out. Hence a coalition was forged with the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) led by Gerard Gerry Fitt and Oliver Napier's Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI).
Probably many supporters and members of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) had overlooked the possibility that Power Sharing would become reality. In fact a vote whether the party would participate in the Executive was barely won by Faulkner.
The fresh coming ministerial team was to take up delicate issues such as policing, internment and, last but not least, realising the Council of Ireland before being installed on 1 January 1974.
Irish Dimension - Council of Ireland
The notion that Ireland is in fact one indivisible entity with its own dynamics, the so-called Irish Dimension, is not reserved for stubborn Irish Nationalists. In fact the Irish Dimension is ingrained in the 1920 Government of Ireland Act. The Ireland Act already provided for a Council of Ireland which, by the way, never materialised because Sinn Féin didn't acknowledge the division of Ireland and refused to share power with the Unionists in the South Irish Parliament. Reality, and by that the underlying idea, however had changed in the course of the intervening years.
The scope of the Ireland Act extends over North and South Ireland, each with their own parliament and both answerable to Westminster. It was aimed for that in due course the two parliaments would merge and in the meantime the Council of Ireland would act as intermediary and glue. In 1973 there was no question about the sovereignty of the Republic of Ireland and it was simply inconceivable that the two parliaments would ever merge under the Crown. The option that the two parliaments would merge under the Harp by consent of the people of all-Ireland at some point in the future was, on the other hand, considered a plausible scenario.
In order to avert this scenario Loyalist paramilitary, whether or not assisted by British military, took the violence across the border and all of a sudden bombs exploded in Dublin and Monaghan.
Unionists, who felt abandoned by the same Union they desperately tried to uphold, followed the negotiations between Prime Minister Edward Heath, Taoiseach, or Prime Minister, Liam Cosgrave and representatives of the Power Sharing Executive with great concern.
Finally, after passionate discussions, the participating parties signed a document which wrongfully became known as the Sunningdale Agreement on 9 December 1973. Strictly speaking the document was merely a communiqué, a report of what was said during the conferences, instead of a legally valid agreement. The signatories, in other words, declared that the communiqué was an accurate reproduction of the talks. Nevertheless, the designation Sunningdale Agreement started a life of its own and unveiled some of the appearance and role of the future Council of Ireland.
Sunningdale Agreement
By the Sunningdale Agreement it was agreed that a Council of Ireland would be set up. It would be confined to representatives of the two parts of Ireland [...]. It would comprise a Council of Ministers with executive and harmonising functions and a consultative role, and a Consultative Assembly with advisory and review functions.. The Consultative Assembly would consist of 30 members of the Dáil Éireann and 30 of the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Council of Ministers would comprise 7 members of the Executive and an equal number of members of the Rialtas, the Cabinet of the Republic of Ireland.
Surprisingly the competences of the Council of Ireland weren't well defined in the Sunningdale Agreement. In fact it is written that As for executive functions, the first step would be to define and agree these in detail. The Conference therefore decided that [...] studies would at once be set in hand to identify [...] areas of common interest in relation to which a Council of Ireland would take executive decisions [...].. The Sunningdale Agreement does however contain a run-down of possible fields, but most if not all items are in fields such as agriculture, commerce and industry. Coincidently these relatively out of danger fields were also the focal point of the European Community (EC), the predecessor of the European Union (EU), which had welcomed the membership of the Republic of Ireland in 1972 and the United Kingdom in 1973. With this in mind one might assume that the Council of Ireland was merely intended to strengthen the role of Ireland and the United Kingdom on a European political and economical level.
Tricky matters, such as extradition, policing and human rights, came on the table but apparently these topics were appeased with vague declarations of intent to study, discuss, consider or reconsider the issue on hand.
In conclusion the communiqué stated that The Conference agreed that a formal conference would be held early in the New Year [1974] at which the British and Irish Governments and the Northern Ireland Executive would meet together to consider reports on the studies which have been commissioned and to sign the agreement reached.. Neither the formal conference, nor the final agreement was put into practice as the course of events ran ahead in the opposite direction.
United Ulster Unionist Council
Unionists and Loyalists, in the run towards the Sunningdale Agreement deeply divided, reunited in the twinkling of an eye only one day after the presentation of the Sunningdale Agreement. Several Loyalist paramilitary organisations, including the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster Special Constabulary Association (USCA), allied in the newly established Ulster Army Council (UAC) with the aim to form an army capable of taking over Northern Ireland to prevent an impending unification with the Republic of Ireland. The party executive body of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) also closed ranks against the Sunningdale Agreement when they voted against the Council of Ireland on 4 January 1974, whereupon Brian Faulkner resigned.
To make bad things even worst Hugh Logue, a member of the Northern Ireland Assembly for the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), poured a few gallons oil on the fire by stating that the Council of Ireland was [...] the vehicle that would trundle Unionists into a united Ireland.
The Sunningdale Agreement was to experience its baptism of fire on 28 February 1974. That day general elections were held in the United Kingdom, but in Northern Ireland the elections were dominated by the Council of Ireland.
In the build-up three parties opposing the Sunningdale Agreement, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the Vanguard Unionist Progressive Party and the anti-White Paper wing of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), had combined forces in the United Ulster Unionist Council (UUUC). By the slogan Dublin is just a Sunningdale away and a well thought out strategy the make shift coalition gained over 51 percent of the votes and 11 of the 12 Northern Ireland seats in the British House of Commons. Although the agreement was no subject of the elections whatsoever, the outcome was obviously a real boost for the opponents of the Sunningdale Agreement.
Surrounded by united opponents the few remaining Unionist supporters of the Assembly and Executive considered a counter move, or maybe they were just looking for a way out of the hornets' nest without loss of face, and brought Articles 2 and 3 of the Bunreacht na hÉireann, or Constitution of the Republic of Ireland, up for discussion. By these articles, which were redrawn after a referendum in 1998, the Republic of Ireland claimed jurisprudence over all Ireland. The Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), subjected to heavy criticism itself by Republicans for sharing power with Unionists, arched its back and refused to review the Sunningdale Agreement.
Ulster Workers' Council Strike
Instead of conciliation the Sunningdale Agreement had only widened the gap between Catholics and Protestants. Out of this ravine a new organisation, the Ulster Workers' Council (UWC), rose in the spring of 1974.
The programme of the Ulster Workers' Council (UWC) was, considering the fact that the organisation posed as a trade union, rather remarkable. The organisation strived for new elections for the Assembly and re-establishing Loyalist control over the province. To achieve this goal they brought two vehicles to bear: civil disobedience and labour unrest. In name the Ulster Workers' Council (UWC) was an autonomous organisation, but due to its rapid growth and high degree of organization it might have been closely associated with the United Ulster Unionist Council (UUUC) and the Ulster Army Council (UAC).
For months the trade union was neglected until a general strike was proclaimed after a debate in the Northern Ireland Assembly on power sharing and the Council of Ireland on 14 May 1974.
The following day, the first day of what became known as the Ulster Workers' Council Strike, the power stations closed down and petrol workers went on strike. Industrial activity immediately came to a halt and transportation crawled to a standstill whether by petrol shortage or roadblocks. In a matter of days Northern Ireland's economy stagnated.
On 17 May 1974 four explosions, three in Dublin and one in Monaghan, claimed the lives of 34 people, including an unborn child. It wasn't until July 1993 that the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) admitted responsibility for the Dublin and Monaghan Bombings. In spite this statement, or more specifically because of the timing, there are still some serious doubts about the full facts of the case.
A crushing speech held by the then British Prime Minister Harold Wilson on 25 May 1974 and mobilising the army against the strikers was like a red rag to a bull. After the sword the Executive unearthed the kid gloves by proposing to postpone the Council of Ireland. The strikers however stood firm. Grocery shops, left without supplies, closed. In the face of severe economic damage and even food shortage the Unionists resigned from the Executive on 28 May 1974 and by that they blew up Power Sharing.
After 14 days of strike the Power Sharing experiment had come to an end. The Sunningdale Agreement returned to its true form: a legal and political rather insignificant communiqué. Direct Rule returned and Northern Ireland was controlled from London ... again.